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Abstract: Several attack models exist today that attempt to describe cyber-attacks to varying degrees of granularity. Fast 
and effective decision-making during cyber-attacks is often vital, especially during incidents in which 
reputation, finance and physical damage can have a crippling effect on people and organisations. Such attacks 
can render an organisation paralysed, DQGLWPD\FHDVHWRIXQFWLRQZHUHIHUWRVXFKDQLQFLGHQWDVD³6\VWHP
)DLOXUH´,QWKLVSDSHUZHSURSRVHDQRYHOFRQFHSWXDOPRGHOWRKHOSDQDO\VWVPDNHSUDJPDWLFGHFLVLRQVGXULQJ
a System Failure. Our model distils the essence of attacks and provides an easy-to-remember framework 
intended to help analysts ask relevant questions at the right time, irrespective of what data is available to them. 
Using abstraction-EDVHG UHDVRQLQJ RXU PRGHO DOORZV HQWHUSULVHV WR DFKLHYH ³VRPH´ VLWXDWLRQDO DZDUHQHVV
during a System Failure, but more importantly, enable them to act upon their understanding and to justify 
their decisions. Abstraction drives the reasoning process making the approach relevant today and in the future, 
unlike several existing models that become deprecated over time (as attacks evolve). In the future, it will be 
necessary to trial the model in exercises to assess its value. 
 ,1752'8&7,21 
Quick decision-making is vital during incidents in 
which reputation, finance and physical damage can 
have a crippling effect on people and organisations. 
Such attacks can render an organisation paralyzed, 
and it may cease to function. A recent example would 
EHWKH6RQ\³7KH,QWHUYLHZ´DWWDFNWKDWUHQGHUHGWKH
operational aspects of Sony inoperable. We refer to 
VXFK DQ LQFLGHQW DV D ³6\VWHP )DLOXUH´ LQ ZKLFK
hardware or software faults, misconfigurations, or the 
intentional work of malicious actors are the reason 
behind the system no longer functioning.  
 
In this paper we propose a novel conceptual model 
to help analysts make pragmatic decisions during a 
System Failure. Our model distils the essence of 
attacks and provides an easy-to-remember framework 
intended to help analysts ask relevant questions at the 
right time, and adopt to the data that is immediately 
available ± allowing our model to be as relevant today 
and in the future, unlike several existing models that 
become deprecated as attacks increase in complexity. 
Our approach expresses different levels of granularity 
on an ad-hoc basis, and complements existing models 
as opposed to competing with them. 
Our model is derived from a number of existing 
models on the topic of attack and response. 
Abstraction drives the reasoning process through a 
VHULHV RI ³Aspects´ LQFOXGLQJ ³Impact´ ³Vector´ 
³Motives´ DQG ³Attribution´ DQG ³Nuances´
(individual properties) of attacks, enabling the model 
to be inclusive about what is needed to be considered 
during the incident response decision-making 
processes. Our model assumes analysts have little 
time to explore all theoretical considerations and have 
to make the most achievable decisions possible with 
scarce data (about the attack) and resources. Due to 
abstraction, our model may not yield the best 
decisions in all circumstances, but it is likely to lead 
to more pragmatic decisions, and more importantly: 
actions that can be justified after the attack. Our 
method has the advantage of: 
x $WWHPSWLQJWR³NQRZWKHXQNQRZQV´ helping 
map out which pieces of the attack puzzle may 
be missing.  
x Decision Documentation of the incident 
response reasons more straightforwardly. 
x Prioritising actions during a System Failure. In 
our paper we present a use case example in which 
our model could have been used and discuss its 
advantages and limitations. 
 5()/(&7,1*21$77$&.
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Many attack models and classification schemes tend 
to describe cyber-attacks in one of two ways; either 
as hierarchical structures or as linear processes. 
Hierarchical structures (e.g., attack trees) have the 
advantage of describing attacks in terms of their 
different properties, but often neglect the temporal 
component e.g. AVOIDIT (Simmons et al 1997), 
CAPEC (MITRE 2015), VERIS (VERIS 2015), 
NIST (NIST 2015), SANS (SANS 2015). Linear 
processes capture the temporal element since they 
assume that actions happen sequentially (Howard and 
Longstaff, 1998; Hutchins et al., 2011), however, 
may fail to describe lateral movement or cases where 
attacks occur in parallel.  
 
Many prior works attempt to outline attacks 
comprehensively or provide explanations of the direst 
consequences when an attack succeeds. In addition, 
they describe ideal solutions, see for instance several 
RI 0,75(¶V HIIRUWV  ),567¶V HIIRUWV 
and VERIS efforts (2015). While these efforts show 
substantial progress in tackling cyber-attacks, they 
may not be feasible for all circumstances, particularly 
when decisions have to be made with limited 
resources (regarding information available and time 
constraints, e.g. during an electric blackout), 
technical and operational common sense has to 
prevail when making decisions and incident 
responses quickly.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, no truly pragmatic 
approach to facilitate understanding of attacks and to 
provide a framework to ensure technical and 
operational sanity exists. It is worth noting here that 
we do not consider practical in terms of convenience, 
but in terms of necessity and efficiency (due to 
limited resources). No model uses easy-to-grasp 
reasoning to aid understanding and response to cyber-
attacks that is able to abstract the technical details of 
an attack and simply consider its properties. Other 
models that we have considered but are not included 
above due to space limitations include (Bishop 1995, 
Lough 2001, Ten et al. 2010), but were still 
considered in our model. 
2.1 Commonalities across Models 
From the models we have reviewed, we were able to 
identify a number of noteworthy differences and 
common factors. For instance, at the core of each of 
the attack models, they detail the specific activities 
leading to the compromise of some security feature 
(whether it be confidentiality, integrity or 
availability) of an asset. While some (e.g., the 
Killchain) place more emphasis on the types of attack 
steps and characterising what goal each step is 
seeking to reach, others (such as VERIS (2015)) 
adopt more general steps and focus on the wider 
problem. In terms of attack modelling, possibly the 
most representative model is that of Howard's 
taxonomy to specify incidents. It captures several of 
the actions within an incident but also sheds light on 
the reason for an attack (e.g., for financial gain, to 
cause system damage, or for political gain).  
 
While attack models allow for a detailed analysis 
of an attack, incident response models consider what 
attack has been launched, but especially how to 
appropriately respond to it. In the NIST model above 
(NIST 2015) for instance, we see a requirement to 
detect an attack, but a majority of the life cycle is on 
responding to it. Some of the key questions in 
incident response target why and how an attack 
occurred, and who caused it. Almost identical 
questions can be found in the SANS model and 
process flow for incidents.  
 
Across the more attack-focused models and those 
more geared to incident response, there are notable 
commonalities. To start, there is an aim to understand 
incidents and clearly define what has been impacted 
and the activities that have led to a breach of an 
DVVHW¶V VHFXULW\ .H\ TXHVWLRQV RQ PRWLYDWLRQ PD\
also inform the choices of actions after attacks.  
 
Our approach shares commonalities with business 
continuity/cyber resilience models (for an overview, 
see Gibson and Tarrant 2010 and Caralli et al. 2010), 
with the key distinction being that our efforts are 
mainly attack focused and intended to be used by 
Security Operations Centres (SOCs) and Computer 
Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) 
3 A PRAGMATIC SYSTEM-
FAILURE ASSESSMENT AND 
RESPONSE MODEL (SAM) 
Our System-failure Assessment and response Model 
(SAM) is a directed human-reasoning approach to 
incident handling that uses abstraction as part of the 
reasoning process. The decision-making process that 
the model promotes is based on deduction and 
experience.  
A series of high-level observables from very basic 
questions are able to provide first-pass indicators of 
how to respond. For instance, in the case of 
attempting to identify impact of an attack, and 
understand what needs to be fixed immediately. An 
overview is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: SAM outlines what questions to consider 
first, as well as an example timeframe we suspect they 
have to be addressed. Note: the timeframe will be 
relative to each attack. 
 
Our method is based on identifying common 
factors between other attack and incident models led 
to the creation of a model that examines cyber-attacks 
in a pragmatic manner. In particular, by asking the 
TXHVWLRQRI³ZKDWPDWWHUVWKHPRVWZKHQGLVDVWURXV
DWWDFNV RFFXU"´ ,W FDQ EH FRQVLGHUHG DV D VHULHV RI
aspects to ask questions about to help identify what 
the best incident response strategy might be. At its 
core, the structure of our model follows directed 
interrogative pronouns in order of importance: What 
LVEHLQJDWWDFNHGZKDW¶VDIIHFWHGKRZLVLWDIIHFWHG"
(Here known as Impact); How is it being attacked 
including when and for how long (namely, attack 
Vectors); Why is it being attacked (or Motive); and, 
Who conducted the attack (i.e. Attribution)? These are 
listed as what we believe to be their importance 
during attacks. This approach uses the common 
factors identified in prior attack-modelling literature 
outlined in Section 2. 
 
By Impact we mean the consequence of an attack, 
one that is achieved through a Vector. Vectors 
describe the means to achieve a Motive. Several 
attack vectors exist in the cyber domain: some are 
technically driven (e.g., exploits such as buffer-
overflow attacks, code injection, or use Trojans, 
viruses, worms, etc.), others social-engineering (e.g. 
phishing attacks). Motives describes the intents of an 
attacker. Attribution should describe who is 
responsible for the attack. 
 
7KH ILUVW TXHVWLRQ LH WKH ³What´ ILOOV LQ WKH
remainder of the other questions, and is crucial to be 
able to answer first. If we do not know what has been 
attacked, it is difficult to consider anything else. 
While the consequences of an attack however, may 
not be immediately clear, identifying what has been 
attacked should be the first priority, as it is only after 
this that we may be able to determine the level of 
damage made. Similar to triage, an estimation of the 
damage must be made to assess what can be done 
afterwards. It is worth noting that time criticality will 
depend on the incident, and the timeframe shown in 
Figure 1 should be considered relative. Also, should 
another incident happen before reaching the end we 
likely have to start again at the Impact aspect, or re-
review whether the initial assessment was correct. 
 
The model attempts to guide analysts and decision 
makers alike by providing a framework of key 
general questions about attacks. These questions 
abstract out the technological component but provide 
the basis for which technical aspects can be applied. 
By asking basic, easy-to-grasp questions, our 
framework can be used to communicate incident-
response decisions quickly to non-technical 
audiences as well, such as business managers, 
lawyers or policy makers, some of whom will be 
responsible of organisation operations. What exactly 
these questions are, can be driven by existing 
standards and models, however, the choice in 
standards available needs to be well-understood by 
everyone on the team before any major incident.  
 
Naturally, precision is lost in abstraction. 
However, it also means that analysts can choose a 
classification scheme or detailed attack model they 
believe is most appropriate to describe the attack. In 
practice this means concepts such as CIA or models 
like Killchain can be used to describe nuances of the 
Impact, while CAPEC and Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (CVSS) can be used to describe 
details (Nuances) about the Vector, see Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: SAM's use of abstraction, the uses of more 
detailed models or inputs can feed into the main 
components of SAM. 
4 APPLYING THE MODEL 
SAM is an abstraction-based approach to understand 
DWWDFNVWRDFKLHYH³some´XQGHUVWDQGLQJTXLFNO\WR
help act upon them. The model distils all components 
of any attack to their bare minimum, and allows 
decision makers to insert details ± using their standard 
of choice (whether of necessity or preference) ± 
where appropriate. Examples could include assigning 
costs to the Impact of attacks, identifying what 
machines have been affected, whether people have 
been hurt by the attack (and to what extent), or CIA 
to describe the area of the attack (as part of Impact, 
HJ ³ZDV LQWHJULW\ DIIHFWHG RI DQ\ FRPSRQHQWV´"
CAPEC could be used to describe the attack Vector. 
Using SAM, we care about understanding as many 
aspects about the attack with as limited resources as 
possible. This means that details may not matter (or 
even be available). 
4.1 As a Mnemonic 
Our model represents a first stage in constructing a 
mnemonic for dealing with a cyber incidents, one we 
expect will be refined in the future. In First Aid there 
is A (Assess and Airways), B (Bleeding and Breaks), 
C (Circulation and Consciousness) and D (Deal). In 
dealing with a physical security incident there are the 
5Cs: Confirm, Clear, Cordon, Control and Close. 
However, unlike the health sector, in cyber systems 
there are other considerations to take into account; 
some of these are mentioned below 
 
Triage assumes that a person is being treated, and 
determines priority of who to treat first. Despite a 
system is being healed, it does not mean is has been 
healed permanently. Healing can happen much faster 
for cyber systems, but attacks can also persists after 
initial incident. Whilst formulating the aspects, the 
order of them raises considerable debate. As an 
analogy of our model to the real world, we can 
express these aspects in the form of responding to a 
hostile situation; such as a person who has just been 
harmed, in which we might say: 
 
Impact: IGHQWLI\ZKDWKDVKDSSHQHGWKHQ³stop the 
bleeding´DQGSUHYHQW IXUWKHU LPPHGLDWHGDPDJH WR
happen. 
Vectors: Identify what the attack weapon was and 
prevent the attack weapon from being used again. 
Motives: Identify the likely reason why the person 
was attacked, and attempt to demotivate the attacker 
to want to find another weapon if the attack was with 
intent. 
Attribution: Identify who the attacker is and disable 
the attacker completely. 
 
If the attacker is malicious, one might say that 
preventing the attack weapon from being used again 
is more important than stopping the bleeding and 
more harm from happening. Having said this, in the 
cyber domain, we argue Impact should be addressed 
first in most situations because the rate of which 
Impact can happen. In most cases in the cyber 
domain, we may be able to cut of connection or 
isolate the damage relatively quickly (e.g. by 
disconnecting the monitored system from the Internet 
or local network), and it should be done first to limit 
the damage. Then, analysts can investigate the attack 
vector, whether it is outward facing or an insider 
attack, it will now be considered an outward facing 
component to a device or a system. Similarly, the 
Motive and Attribution aspects may be swapped ± it 
may not be possible to understand motives of an 
attacker before one understands who the attacker is, 
however, in our use cases, our ability to identify 
motives was far greater than the ability to identify 
who the attacker was. The exact order of aspects, or 
means to validate the order is subject to further 
research.  
4.2 In Operational Environments 
SOC-like environments are often overwhelmed by 
network and intrusion-detection system alerts every 
day, and strive to understand the threat landscape. 
There is an important distinction we make between 
this model and cyber-incident handling more 
generally. This model is intended to be used during 
System Failures only, i.e. attacks that have crippled 
the monitored system to a point in which even cyber 
observables are limited. Our model in an operational 
environment follows a feedback loop, as shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3: SAM in an Operational Environment. 
 
Once a New Incident has happened, an assessment 
of the Impact is made by asking the appropriate 
questions pertaining to what has been observed. 
Decisions are made and executed based on observable 
evidence and common sense reasoning related to the 
Impact of the system.  
 
After decisions have been made related to the 
Impact, we progress in a similar fashion and 
reasoning structure until decisions have been made 
(and executed) related to Attribution. After an 
incident, Post-Incident Analysis can be conducted (if 
any are in place), and existing procedures can be 
reviewed and implemented, until a New Incident 
comes in again, and the loop is repeated. Each answer 
gained from the model should allow elucidation of 
how best to respond to the attack at that juncture. 
There are particularly difficult corner cases such as 
reputational damage (i.e. reputational damage is 
difficult to measure the long-term impact of), which 
we are contemplating for future work. 
5 DISCUSSION 
Our model is a first version of an approach that is able 
to describe attack behaviour in terms of four 
constituent components by distilling observables to 
their essence and making decisions from this 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ 7KH SURSRVLWLRQ RI ³ILUVW ZKDW WKHQ
KRZ WKHQ ZK\ WKHQ ZKR´ DV D SLSHOLQH LV QRW D
controversial one. Indeed, we argue that most security 
experts naturally respond in the order presented in 
SAM anyway. However, with this pipeline happening 
across the board informally, and no one having 
identified it as such is an observation we believe is 
worth sharing to enable analysts to more effectively 
communicate through a shared incident-response 
mental pipeline model. This helps communication 
during incidents, but also helps for planning red 
teaming exercises (through storyboarding using our 
pipeline), but also allows analysts to identify when 
nuances of attacks distinguish themselves from past 
incidents. This is helpful in the immediate future as 
ZH¶UH DEOH WR FODVVLI\ WKRVH QXDQFHV LQWR GLIIHUHQW
domains describing the attack. 
5.1 Strategic Role of SAM 
Our model serves as first-pass mechanism to respond 
to incidents quickly, by reviewing key, generic 
aspects of an attack and being able to ask the right 
questions about the attack at the right time, regardless 
of type of attack; whether it be a zero-day exploit or 
an APT.  
 
The main purpose of SAM is to support the 
immediate response to a cyber event the model also 
fulfils important strategic functions. Time is of equal 
importance to the strategic decision maker as it is to 
the tactical cyber analysis trying to deliver a solution. 
Both are involved in the damage limitation process. 
At this point, focus is not on the detail; it is on the 
message that something is wrong. This message is not 
just for those at the coalface. Other actors including 
system users, senior decision makers and externally 
those who may face a similar threat need to be made 
aware. This is a task for which SAM is well suited. Its 
format provides the means to alert internal and 
external audiences. Providing adequate insight to 
activate the necessary emergence response within the 
challenging time constraints and without 
overwhelming recipients with superfluous detail that 
is arguably not important at that juncture.  
 
6$0¶V G\QDPLF construct allows details to be 
obtained, in a structured manner over time. This 
accumulation of facts is critical in enabling informed 
decision-making. As time progresses the immediacy 
of dealing with the reality of the attack transfers to 
dealing with its consequences. These consequences 
are increasingly both internal and external. Internally, 
these might include the extent to which the system 
can continue to operate or the level of damage that has 
been done. Externally, consequences might involve 
mitigation to protect reputation or the need to inform 
partners of a potential threat in order to safe guard 
WKHLU LQWHUHVWV 6$0¶V DELOLW\ WR HVWDEOLVK WKLV
structured feed of detail, whilst maintain simplicity 
and the spread of erroneous information is a key 
contributor in ensuring appropriate decision-making.  
Of great importance will be which recovery and 
resilience measures should be activated. 
5.2 Red Teaming 
Helping cyber-security analyst defend their systems 
better during particularly devastating attacks. SOCs 
and CERTs are some of the few intended audiences 
we have in mind for the model as it currently stands. 
We believe, however, it is possible to use the model 
to also design Red Team activities (i.e. ethical 
hacking to improve the system). Applications of this 
might help pen testers storyboard attack scenarios in 
a structured, reproducible manner. This may perhaps 
be best done by starting the model in the reverse 
order: beginning with who is attacking, moving on to 
why they are attacking, to how the attack is 
implemented (as a means to achieve the why the 
attack is taking place), and finally outline the intended 
impact. As an activity, it can:  
 
x Provide insight into the threat and hence inform 
decisions over the level of risk;  
x Act as a mechanism to exercise and assess an 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VHPHUJHQF\UHVSRQVHSODQQLQJ 
x Be used to generate options not previously 
considered in times of disaster. 
 
5.3 Scoring Systems and Nuances 
Conceivably, the model could be implemented 
similarly to vulnerability scoring systems such as 
CVSS (FIRST 2015). By having a form that asks a 
series of straightforward questions relating to the four 
main aspects it may be possible to extrapolate direct 
relationships between what has been observed, and 
possible remedies (first-pass indicators about what to 
do next). In the case of attempting to identify 
³,PSDFW´ DQG ZKDW QHHGV IL[LQJ ³QRZ´ TXHVWLRQV
DERXW ³1XDQFHV´ PLJKW KHOS WKH GHFLVLRQ SURFHVV
(DFK RI WKHVH 1XDQFHV VKRXOG KHOS DQVZHU ³:KDW
actions can we do to stop or limit the (aspecW"´
Conceivably, each of these aspects could be 
formalised and better defined to better process them 
in automated systems or deliver precise metrics that 
help describe the attacks. 
 
Examples of nuances might be asking questions 
about the Measurability of the attack Impact (i.e. 
what has been observed as affected? (listing people, 
physical items, hardware, software, finance, 
reputation etc.)), its Influence (i.e. how is the impact 
affecting the system? (e.g., listing CIA per affected 
Impact)), the Duration of the Impact or 
Transparency of the Impact (i.e., how visible the 
Impact is). In the case of Vector, we might be 
interested in exploring Nuances such as 
Implementation LH³ZKDWWHFKQRORJLHVKDUGZDUH
and software) and protocols were involved to 
implemHQWWKHDWWDFN"´Deployment LH³KRZZDV
WKH DWWDFN OLNHO\ GHSOR\HG"´ )RU H[DPSOH QHWZRUN
vulnerability exploit or similar.), Distribution (i.e., 
how distributed is the attack? For example, what 
physical location in the real-world are affected?), or 
Repeatability (i.e. how repeatable is the attack?). 
From the Patterns in the Vector or by identifying the 
intended Target, it may be possible to obtain 
Motives, and finally, we may obtain (likely) 
Attribution through an analysis of all of the 
aforementioned Aspects and Nuances. Future work 
will explore exactly which Nuances to consider, and 
how the model could be implemented in a tool. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we provided a way to organise thinking 
and prioritise effort when dealing with system 
failures. SAM is intended to be a model through 
which technical and non-technical decision makers 
can easily communicate and make better decisions 
collaboratively during major incidents in which time 
is of the essence and information is lacking 
significantly.  
The model enforces common-sense reasoning, 
enables justifiable decision making that are based on 
empirical evidence where available. Future 
assessment is necessary to say with confidence 
whether our model effectively achieves its aims. We 
intend to conduct studies with SOC analysts under a 
variety of different use case scenarios. 
REFERENCES 
Bishop, M. (1995). A taxonomy of unix system and 
network vulnerabilities. Technical report, Technical 
Report CSE-95-10. Department of Computer Science, 
University of California at Davis. 
Caralli, R.A., Allen, J and White, D. W., (2010). CERT 
Resilience Management Model: A Maturity Model for 
Managing Operational Resilience. Addison-Wesley 
Professional. 
Cohen, F. (1997). Information system defences: a 
preliminary classification scheme. Computers & 
Security, 16(2):94±114. 
FIRST. (2005). Common Vulnerability Scoring System. 
http://www.first.org/cvss. 
FIRST. (2015). FIRST Security Library. 
https://www.first.org/library. 
*LEVRQ &$ DQG 7DUUDQW 0  $ µFRQFHSWXal 
PRGHOV¶DSSURDFKWRRUJDQLVDWLRQDOUHVLOLHQFH 
Howard, J. D. and Longstaff, T. A. (1998). A common 
language for computer security incidents. Sandia 
Report: SAND98-8667, Sandia National Laboratories, 
http://www.cert.org/research/taxonomy 988667.pdf. 
Hutchins, E. M., Cloppert, M. J., and Amin, R. M. (2011). 
Intelligence-driven computer network defense 
informed by analysis of adversary campaigns and 
intrusion kill chains. Leading Issues in Information 
Warfare & Security Research, 1:80. 
Lough, D. L. (2001). A taxonomy of computer attacks with 
applications to wireless networks. PhD thesis. 
MITRE. (2015) Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and 




NIST. (2012). Computer security incident handling guide. 
Technical report. 
SANS (2004). Global information assurance certification 
paper. Technical report. 
Simmons, C., Shiva, S., Dasgupta, D., and Wu, Q. (2009). 
AVOIDIT: A cyber attack taxonomy. University of 
Memphis, Technical Report CS-09-003. 
Ten, C.W., Manimaran, G., and Liu, C.-C. (2010). 
Cybersecurity for critical infrastructures: attack and 
defense modeling. Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part 
A: Systems and Humans, IEEE Transactions on, 
40(4):853±865. 
VERIS. (2015). Vocabulary for Event Recording and 
Incident Sharing. http://veriscommunity.net/ 
